UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

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SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD

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ORAL ARGUMENT

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IN THE MATTER OF:

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO, d/b/a XCEL ENERGY, Complainant

v.

STB Docket No. 42057

THE BURLINGTON NORTHERN AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Respondent.

Mercury Building 7th Floor Hearing Room 1925 K Street N.W. Washington, D.C. 20423-0001

Thursday, March 18, 2004

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m.

BEFORE:

ROGER NOBER, Chairman, STB

APPEARANCES:

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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

(10:01 a.m.)

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Well, good morning, everyone.

The Board will come to order and today we have an oral argument in the rate

reasonableness case of Xcel vs Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad.

Now, this is the third oral argument that's been held by the Board but I'm

pleased to say that they have now become standard operating practice in

every large rate case. We held oral arguments in two of the Eastern cases

and found them to be productive in ways, I think, that were transparent to the

folks at large and some that weren't. These arguments have given the Board

an opportunity to probe the issues about which we have questions to hear

from the parties about the points they want to highlight and I can assure you

that in every one of these you've raised questions that we thought we knew

the answer to that made us go back and take a second look and other matters

which we thought we didn't understand which you had an opportunity to

clarify and unfortunately, I can't tell you which was which.

So I'm pleased that we've done this and look forward to

today's argument. Now, in their submissions to the Board, the parties have

raised a number of subjects that they will raise at the hearing at issue in this

case and in addition to the issues raised by the parties in their submissions,

we have also put out some of our own. As you know from the Eastern

decisions, we have worked hard to insure that our evidentiary decisions are

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consistent whenever possible from case to case.

I think the parties deserve consistency and predictability in

their cases and we strive for that. Now, I'd like to bring the same kind of

consistency to the Western cases. That's why one of the questions we pose

today was to justify the road property and operating expenses in this case and

why they differ significantly or should differ significantly from those in

recent Western cases. Now, I recognize that departures from prior cases can

be appropriate based on the circumstances of a particular case but in the

interest of consistency and predictability, there should be reasons for such

departures and I think we'll try to probe that some today or at least the royal

we will.

Now the other issue we've asked you to focus on is whether

the Board should alter or change its method used to set the maximum

reasonable rate if the evidence shows that the revenues generated by the

traffic group exceed the revenues of the stand-alone railroad. Now, I know

that the railroad is advocating for the Board to continue using its current

methodology and that the shipper proponent is asking for us to take two

alternatives.

In the most recent -- in one of the recent Eastern cases, the

Board listened to and welcomed proposals for feasible alternatives that would

conform with the statute and the coal rate guidelines and I look forward to

hearing your thoughts on that issue and maybe we'll even have some of our

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own. Now, I also understand that the parties intend to raise issues of their

own regarding road property investments, including the inclusion of

cross-over traffic, a density adjustment and the inclusion of the Jeffrey

Energy Center traffic and we look forward to that discussion today as well.

Now, procedurally, each side has 45 minutes, although

traditionally these have taken longer. Xcel has indicated that it will reserve

some of this time for rebuttal and that's fine. And the Burlington Northern

has asked to apportion some of its time between in-house and outside

counsel, which is also fine. Now, I understand that the parties intend to use

Powerpoint slides today as part of their presentations and I just want to say

this; that while I welcome the use of technology in these arguments, I want to

remind parties that Powerpoint slides are an aid to and should not be a

distraction from the presentations and if we find that they are, we'll shut them

off and you can submit them for the record.

So with that, thank you for coming and I look forward to

your presentations, and Mr. Wilcox, I guess you are first.

MR. WILCOX: Yes, I'm Thomas Wilcox. I'm appearing

on behalf of the Complainant. Also with me is Mr. David Benz from our

firm. We also have a couple of representatives of Xcel Energy here today

with us. I think the Chairman has met both of these gentlemen on one or

two occasions. I do want to commend the Board for holding oral argument.

I think that it is a good idea in these cases. I think it's an idea -- a good way

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to vet out the issues and have a little dialogue and get past all the paper and

we've also had some staff involvement in the last couple of weeks on the

computer modeling issues, which also I found to be very helpful as well.

We have a forum in this case. I'm going to talk about

several key issues that I listed and I'm also prepared to talk about the issues

that you listed in the order of the 11th. We've prepared some counsel's

exhibits. They are in Powerpoint form. I'm going to hand those out to the

Board and to opposing counsel because I agree, Powerpoint, I think, can help

in these proceedings but I think that they can be a distraction. So these are

designed to facilitate the discussion and I hand them out to you because if

you see something you want to jump to, I'd be more than happy to do it.

We've also prepared a map. This is a map that's a little

slightly different than what's in the record. It's more conceptual. There are

more accurate maps in terms of the railroad at ExhibitIII-A-1 of our evidence

and then BNSF also has it as their evidence as well.

Overall -- some overall context. We filed our complaint in

late 2000. Evidence was filed -- opening evidence was filed in January 2003

and briefs were filed in September 2003. So the evidence in this case

post-dated the and decisions. It overlaps with the decision and preceded all

three of the Eastern cases.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Let me ask, would you have

changed your presentation based on our decisions in the Eastern cases?

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MR. WILCOX: I don't think so. The one -- one of the

issues, obviously, is the division of revenues issue that came up and the

modification of the modified mileage block pro rate. We did use the

modified mileage block pro rate in this case because that had been used in

prior cases. We analyzed that and the use of the MSP and we don't -- I guess

at the end of the day, we don't have a problem with the use of MSP in this

case.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Now, the Burlington Northern has

asked for a different allocation of revenues --

MR. WILCOX: Yes. Well --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: -- than we did in the Eastern

cases.

MR. WILCOX: Yes, but they also ask for the exact same

allocation that all three of the railroads asked for in those cases and it's the

exact same formula and it suffers from the exact same deficiencies. They

filed what they called a clarification of their evidence in this case and we've

responded to that. There's a -- so there's a very full record on what they want

to do with cross-over traffic and this methodology but our position is, it's the

same methodology. It suffers from the same -- the exact same deficiencies.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: And what would you say those

are?

MR. WILCOX: They say that the fixed costs is the same

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for high density and lower density lines. They haven't fixed that yet and

they try to say that, you know, use the URCS variable cost calculation to sort

of bootstrap into that but I think we show convincingly in our reply to their

clarification that even that shows that it's skewed towards giving revenues to

the carrier because they use their own variable costs which are a lot lower

than the stand-alone railroad so it had a deficiency going in as to allocation.

So we don't think that they've -- clearly we think what they filed as a petition

for reconsideration of the NS case. They haven't shown it's any different.

It's the exact same experts and exact same formula. They even admit it's the

same formula. So that's our position on that.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: I was trying to figure out, though, in looking at that

proposal, what would happen in the real world, which I know in the

stand-alone world isn't something that, you know, we always apply but that,

you know, under our theory, I guess there's two carriers that originate out of

the Powder River Basin and one carrier that's the terminating carrier, so I

guess in the shipper world, that's the bottleneck carrier and so I guess in the

real world, they would have the advantage in the negotiations, wouldn't they?

MR. WILCOX: Well, it depends if there's a true

bottleneck, then a bottleneck goes --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: It would depend, right, if they

could inter-line with the UP or not.

MR. WILCOX: But I think then you're getting into the

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discussion of -- sorry, of the market based rates versus cost based rates.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: No, I know, we can't let the real

world get too far into this.

MR. WILCOX: Right. But I think the

Board is trying to work to define what is a proper allocation of cross-over

revenues to take into account densities, but I don't think that -- I mean,

certainly not on this record, and I don't think we're there yet, so I think that

the closest thing you've come to so far is MSP and we don't have an objection

to using that in this case.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Okay.

MR. WILCOX: Xcel has presented the Board with a very

conservative, we think, straight forward, stand-alone cost analysis in

accordance with the established SAC rules and policies behind the guidelines.

And those guidelines establish a balance between the carrier's statutory right

to differentially price in the protection of captive shippers from monopoly

pricing.

In contrast to us, BNSF's participation has been just a broad

array of extreme positions trying to convince the Board to change the rules.

In a nutshell, they want to change the rules to tip the balance away from

protecting captive shippers more towards allowing them to engage in

essentially unfettered monopoly pricing. They make a big deal about how

demanding the Pawnee plan is and that they should be able to charge all the

way up to the point where the plant stops burning coal but that's -- the SAC

analysis stops way short of that. Anyway --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: That's true, although I was noting

in your brief that -- I actually read them, that you spend the first part of your

brief essentially saying BN has a policy to raise rates, right, that that's what, I

think from the highest levels on down and I don't think there's any secret to

that. I get, you know, every week analysts' reports and they all say raise

rates. So let's just assume for the moment that that's probably true.

But on the other hand, say that we can't take into account,

you know -- BN counters by saying that well, they're revenue inadequate

which -- and that they should have unfettered right to raise rates.

MR. WILCOX: Right.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: As you said, and how do we take

those considerations into account? I mean, typically, as you said, in a SAC

case, we look at it on the merits and we look at it on the case and motives, for

better or for worse, are not a part of it. But you, yourselves, try to bring

motives into it. I mean, should we either look at them or not look at them?

How do -- I've been kind of struggling with that. What do we -- what's the

sort of relevance of all that?

MR. WILCOX: Well, the Board, I know, has been

struggling in sort of the gaming issue, but the SAC analysis is designed when

you conduct the analysis, to make the carrier revenue adequate for the issue

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traffic. It's designed to help them to become revenue adequate by

determining the proper rate to the SAC analysis. And that rate, especially in

this case, is above the jurisdictional threshold and in our rebuttal we're not at

or below the jurisdictional threshold, we're above. This rate, if you were to

accept our evidence, would be, you know, up around I think over 200 percent

of their variable cost.

So we -- our position is that the policies and the guidelines

in place and the ones in place when we evaluated the case to file the case, are

sufficient to help them become revenue adequate without more, without

changing the rules, fundamental policies like eliminating cross-over traffic,

you know, fundamental part of the stand-alone cost guidelines. They want

to just do away with it. And it's all designed to increase the amount of

revenues they get out of a particular movement and our position is the

standards as they are give them plenty of assistance.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Fair enough.

MR. WILCOX: Speaking of the rates, we do allege and I

think the evidence shows these rates -- the rates they implemented are

extremely high in this instance. We've got a basically 24 mill rate which is

twice -- over twice what the average is. It's much higher than what was

prescribed at TMPA and this line is essentially a subset of that movement, so

there's no question these rates are exorbitant and we believe that the evidence

clearly shows that they are unreasonable.

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CHAIRMAN NOBER: Now, I'm sorry, the 113.6 mill,

that's -- you're saying for the Western -- what's WCC?

MR. WILCOX: That's our traffic group. We have 37

coal shippers and we took the --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Okay, that's -- it's not something

else.

MR. WILCOX: Right.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: And you're saying the average for

those captive plants is 13.6?

MR. WILCOX: Mills, yes.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: And this rate is 24.2.

MR. WILCOX: 24.2 mills, right, and then TMPA rate

12.9 and then we just added the -- there's a Board study that was done in

1999 showing the average rate which I assume includes captive as well as --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Competitive.

MR. WILCOX: -- competitive traffic. I think let's go

through these next two real quickly. I just wanted to emphasize that you're

not facing the same analysis you faced in the last four cases, very long

railroads, some new concepts in terms of off-line reroutes and things like

that. It's very straightforward. It's only about 400 miles long. It's clearly a

coal handling railroad. We're not diverting from the way BNSF handles

their traffic in the real world. It's very simply put together, single track,

double track. It's only got one commodity. We don't have any joint line

operations in the PRB.

We have -- it's directional. I have my -- I'll try not to burn

a hole in opposing counsel but we have -- you know, it's very -- it collects the

coal up in the mine areas, takes them down a loaded direction, drops some off

here. Interchanges at the intercept this way, interchanges with UP. This is

the Jeffrey traffic, comes further down, delivers to Pawnee. It interchanges

traffic to go south to Texas and points down there. And then the empties

come back up. They're staged in the yards, just as BNSF does and in the real

world only more efficiently.

And the other thing that it seems you're getting lost in all

the noise about computer models is that this railroad is based on a real live

railroad. One of the experts Xcel used was Mr. Richard McDonald, a 42

year railroading guy who is the vice president of WRPI and who is

responsible for planning -- for the planning, construction and operation of

WRPI so we've argued with BNSF about how much the two are alike, but the

fact of the matter is, they agree it's the original configuration that -- of WRPI

and it serves the same function as Work B used to do and then we've shown

that if you look at -- you know, when UP took over the line in 1999 it's

comparable. In fact, we're having less trains and our double-tracking is more

on a percentage basis. So the railroad is presumptively feasible and it's -- we

question -- then we can argue about the proper operating parameters.

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CHAIRMAN NOBER: Let's just start with the

construction of it. I mean, you in your brief, and one of the things that we

look at is what -- how does this railroad compare in terms of its mileage and

cost per mile to prior Western cases and we've had a number that are very

similar to this. This one, I mean, how does your proposal compare to our

prior cases versus what the defendant's proposals do and why should we

differ?

CHAIRMAN NOBER: We have the one chart in our brief

and we've included that in the stack of materials you have there.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: You have, yeah, the road property

investment and the operating expenses.

MR. WILCOX: Right, and then we've reproduced it here

as well, but our -- there is it. If you look at the more recent cases, and

particularly TMPA, you know, that's \$1.7 million per track mile and BNSF is

proposing that it be a million dollars more per track mile. Now, in -- if you

think about it, the actual cost on a per track mile basis should be --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Are these indexed or are these

straight numbers? I mean, are these indexed for inflation? Are these --

MR. WILCOX: They're not indexed.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: So the earlier ones would be a

little higher.

MR. WILCOX: Yes, yes, that's right, that's a good point.

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But the TMPA should actually even be -- we should even be lower than that

because -- or at least comparable, because TMPA went through several

major cities and there were some additional bridges, you know. So on a per

mile basis, we should at least be comparable, perhaps even lower.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Which one are you the closest to?

I know I should know this, but -- of those?

MR. WILCOX: TMPA, but I haven't -- if you -- as you

say we haven't accounted for the inflation on the other two. I just don't

know. But if you want to talk about the reasons, they have -- most of the

difference between the two is in road grading. There's a \$500 million

difference on, you know, road bed preparation and there's a number of things

going on there where they want us to actually, you know, move a rail yard we

don't think needs to be moved. There is -- they used a computer model to

talk about movement of rock out of area for the Guernsey yard, yet they

didn't produce the computer model, so we don't think that's probative

evidence.

They -- other areas, they believe that where we're putting

the Guernsey yard is solid rock the whole thing, whereas it's actually the

aggregate, so there's a number of things we've laid out in the evidence that

counters what they've done in terms of investment.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Now, even if you take the

Guernsey yard out, it's still well above the average for the most recent ones;

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is that right?

MR. WILCOX: Yes. We've got -- we've got that one

here. Well, yes, it is.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Okay. And why -- what do you

attribute that to?

MR. WILCOX: I've got my cheat sheet here. Well, 515

million is in road bed preparation. Thirty-three million is in bridges. We

don't agree with their evidence on the bridges. They have -- they've included

100 turnouts for the WCC to cross BNSF track up in the PRB and we -- I

mean, that's clearly a barrier to entry. You know, the railroad does not -- the

WCC is a replacement for the BNSF. It's not a new competitor of BNSF.

That's a \$26 million item.

They added \$200 million in contingency fees, so, that gives

you an idea.

Let's go to the Jeffrey. Now, one of the issues in the case

which -- one of the issues in the case which we don't think should be an issue

is the diversion of the Jeffrey Energy traffic, the reroute and essentially, what

we're talking about is we're taking -- this is Eagle Butte where the -- most of

the Jeffrey traffic comes from. They also take oil from Belle Ayr. It

usually comes this way down the Edgemont Line. BNSF interchanges with

Northport. We're going this way and interchanging with Northport, with the

UP at Northport.

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So the starting place is the same. Ending place is the

same. It's an on-SARR reroute. And this reroute was -- there was no

question about it in WTU, no issue by the Board, no issue by BNSF -- excuse

me, BN at that time, whether it was valid. And then even more significantly,

this reroute, the same reroute occurred in TMPA in the case where reroute

was a big issue -- rerouting was a big issue and had a bearing on the outcome

of the case. And this is a large component of our movement.

It's about 10 percent of our first year tons and so we think if

the reasons were there in **TMPA** it would have made the difference between

whether that rate was reasonable or not.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: How would you respond to the

railroad's reasons for excluding it here?

MR. WILCOX: Okay, that's what's next.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Okay.

MR. WILCOX: All right, go back. First of all, we

accounted for all the -- in our opening evidence, accounted for all the

operation and cost of moving the traffic. And if you apply -- you know,

when the Board began to talk about rerouting was the TMPA which came out

between our opening round and reply round, if you apply -- and when there's

discussions further about burdens and things like that. But if you apply that

type of burden of proof, we have a very slight burden here. I mean, the

routing is only about one percent longer down to the plant and it's actually

shorter from the other line, although albeit they take most of the coal from

Eagle Butte.

BNSF has used the route in the past. Now, they say,

"Well, we don't use it very much", but the fact of the matter is they have used

it. We provide the service that's superior to BNSF. It's simpler than real

life. We're only hauling half of BNSF real- life tons in the base year. Most

of -- I mean, 10 percent of that is Jeffrey. No joint line operations to deal

with in terms of congestion and things like that. Directional running, you

don't have to worry about, you know, trains going north and south. There's a

helper service on the Edgemont line we're going to avoid.

You know, BNSF raised some congestion arguments in

their brief and whereas in reply the only thing they talked about was cycle

times, which I'm going to get to in a minute, but we've moved to strike that

from BNSF's brief because we think that argument comes way too late in just

trying to rehabilitate.

As to the cycle time, what BNSF did is they compared our

peak period which is the busiest possible time on our railroad in the year

2020, they compared those cycle times to their average annual cycle times

and there's really no comparison, I mean, because that's the busiest possible

time on our railroad whereas average annual goes up and down. But even if

you make that comparison for our opening evidence, we still are short for

three out of the four quarters because we felt that you know, BN improperly

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weighted the time from the two mines and in if you weight them properly,

we're actually lower, but so you can -- I think at a minimum on opening, I

think you can say that we're -- it's comparable and I think even better but the

fact of the matter is, that in response to their motion to dismiss in February of

this year -- of last year, and in our rebuttal, some of the corrections we made

to some of data errors on rebuttal, the cycle times go down and if you do the

same study, if the Board looks at the same -- went through the same process

where they took some of the output from the string model and did the cycle

times, if you do that same analysis, the cycle times are much lower, so we

think there's no question it's better service.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: This raises one of the most

difficult issues we have which come now in virtually every case and

something that we are struggling with which is the fact that on the one hand

the sort of physical plant of the railroad is designed to handle a certain traffic

group but we don't know what that traffic group is until down the line, so

each of you have designed a railroad and have operating plans to address

different traffic and ultimately as we've done in recent cases, we've picked a

traffic group that might be different than what both sides have and neither of

your operating plans or physical plans actually match those and then we're

kind of left to, how do we mesh those and sync those up.

MR. WILCOX: Right.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: And I mean, that's a situation that,

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in theory could be happening here as well depending on what we do with the

Jeffrey energy movement. You know, we have your operating plan, which,

you know, with all due respect, I think we have never accepted in 12 straight

cases and then we have on the other hand, the railroad's operating plan but it

doesn't include 10 percent of the movements and how would we sync those

up? What would you have us do?

Well, I think the Board is -- I mean, if we were to -- and I'm

not saying that we would do that, but if we were to do that, how would we do

that?

MR. WILCOX: Well, I think that in every case -- I mean,

there's so many issues that in every case the Board is going to be called on to

make some calls on what is the appropriate operating plan. As you point

out, the Complainant's operating plan in whole has never been accepted.

There's always arguments about how much -- whether the Complainant has

put enough capacity on the line and then there's arguments that as in this case,

where BNSF wants our railroad to look like the BNSF. They do it and just

-- the railroads do that. They want you to be more complicated and less

efficient. They don't think you can make it that efficient, so I think that the

Board should do what it's always done, is to weigh the evidence, apply the --

and we believe you've got enough evidence in this case to make those

decisions.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: But that would -- I mean, the issue

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for us then would be, you know, this is a slightly longer movement and

whether we use that standard on our cross-over as opposed to -- you know, a

cross-over we'll deal with later, but it's slightly longer so there would be some

-- a slight burden of proof if we took that standard to show that this was

feasible. The problem is, you know, we don't have an operating plan to

show that, so we have to try to -- we have to look at, are the cycle times

comparable? Can the railroad physical plant handle it and that's something

that I guess we would have to extrapolate.

MR. WILCOX: Well, not necessarily.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: And how would we do that is the

problem?

MR. WILCOX: Not necessarily because the

Complainants in these cases, at least in our -- well, I can't speak for all

Complainants, but in our case the stand-alone railroad in terms of capacity

and operating is conservative in that it's all based off of, you know, the peak

-- the busiest time on the railroad. And then all of the investment for that

period 20 years in the future, is built in year one.

So you know, it's -- I think that -- and the same thing with

cycle times, that if you look in the year 2020 and see that the cycle times are

comparable or better than the actual times of 2001, I think that you can

comfortably make that decision, that the routing is more efficient.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Okay.

MR. WILCOX: How am I doing on time?

Let me get to one issue. One of the things that we've asked for in --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: I'm sorry, go ahead.

MR. WILCOX: That's okay. One of the things we've asked for in this case is that the Board use the RCAF-A to escalate operating expenses over the life of the DCF model. We believe that we've shown that the WCC will enjoy enough -- a sufficient enough productivity over its life to justify using the RCAF-A rather than the RCAF-U.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Where will you get those productivity gains from? Maybe I should take notes.

MR. WILCOX: Well, primarily -- primarily, this is something different than BNSF because our density is going to increase about 26 percent over the life of the railroad, yet, the investment, the full physical plant is going to be in place on the very first year.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: So how would that show up as a productivity improvement?

MR. WILCOX: Well, you've already -- you've made the investment and then that's a sunk cost in the first year and then your revenues and tonnages are increasing and density and your overall operating costs are kind of -- I mean, that's a significant productivity gain and that's something that I think is different than the real world, but and then we've also talked --

this has come up in other cases, technology, more efficient operations, new

locomotives, things like that. I think what I've seen or what we've seen in

the cases is that the Board has shown a recognition that stand-alone railroads

enjoy some kind of productivity but the question is, you know, whether to use

the RCAF-U or RCAF-A and you've erred on the side of using RCAF-U.

Now, I'll note that in the Eastern cases, the density didn't go

beyond 10 percent. I mean, you didn't use the RCAF-A in those cases, it

didn't increase, whereas in our case, it has.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: We struggled with this and this

came up at a prior oral argument because, you know, on the one hand, you

know, I'm sympathetic to the argument that over 20 years you're going to

have increasing volumes, you're going to get better at running a railroad and,

you know, even efficient firms have productivity increases. That just seems

to me to be a, you know, perfectly logical argument.

MR. WILCOX: Right.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Now, would you get as much as if

you were an existing railroad that was replacing legacy assets with newer

ones, you know, it seems like that would overstate the -- you know, to get

that level of productivity increase would probably over-state it and you know,

if let's just say we agreed that zero was too low and the full adjusted RCAF

was too high, what would be a way of sort of striking a middle ground? Do

you have any thoughts on that?

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MR. WILCOX: I do, in fact. Your request for a specific

proposal came in one of the Eastern cases after our record was closed so --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: I don't think we got any, did we?

MR. WILCOX: No, you didn't get one.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: We didn't get any.

MR. WILCOX: You asked for one, you didn't get one.

Well, we have two --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: That's not uncommon, I have to

tell you.

MR. WILCOX: We think there's two ways that you can

test the propriety of using RCAF-A. And I -- before my colleagues jump up,

they're not in the record because, you know, that request came after the

record was closed.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: That's okay, I'm asking you now.

MR. WILCOX: All right, one way we think the Board

could do it is the Board could apply its 290, Sub 4 total factor productivity

procedures that it applies to all railroads to the stand-alone railroad and take

the inputs that you would use for a -- you know, BNSF, take the same costing

inputs and then the, you know, revenue for that output index and plug that

into your existing formula and come up with what a productivity would look

like. Now, we have given it some thought and I've got -- we have like a

two-page summary that we could give to the Board and counsel later today.

We can address it in post-argument briefs, if you want, but that's one way to

do it and that's sort of the concept in a nutshell.

The other way to do it is that you know, the Board has

moved towards using EIA pricing forecast for coal and that forecast has a

productivity component in it. And there's a way -- there's -- the way to use

that would be to take out that productivity component and replace the -- what

the Board would use to adjust the RCAF, the STB's productivity adjustment,

and replace that and that way, since the productivity is geared only to coal,

because that's what your question was, was how do we know where the coal

railroad would do versus the rest of the system.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: And a new railroad versus a

legacy one.

MR. WILCOX: Right.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: I mean, they're both relevant, I

think.

MR. WILCOX: Right, but you can -- and I'm not making

stuff out of thin air because it actually has been proposed.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: We'd appreciate any suggestions

on the subject.

MR. WILCOX: Some version of this, I've scanned it, but I

haven't really digested it, some version of this has been proposed to the Board

in the AEP Texas case. But we have some additional materials that we

could submit and have the Board kind of talk about, but those are two ways

that you could try to derive a coal movement only, you know, SAC graph, for

want of a better term, on productivity and I think, because you've got -- you

know, RCAF-U way up here and then RCAF-A somewhere down here, but

you're trying to find out whether you should get right down to the RCAF-A

which we think the evidence shows you should do in this case, but those

methods can show you where -- we think, where it might fall.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Well, sir, we appreciate having

some innovative thought on the matter. I'm going to confess to not being

immediately off-hand familiar with what 290 Sub 4 is, but we'll find out.

MR. WILCOX: Would you like us to -- I mean, we can

submit something to the Board.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: We'll have to figure out exactly

what form to take that in at the end of the argument. We'll try to probe

whether or not you all want to do post-argument briefs or just have individual

submissions.

MR. WILCOX: Okay.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: I think I'm open to either one. I'll

leave it to you all what you think is the most helpful. I will say on that

subject, I do think that since we have decided three cases since these briefs

came in, you know, I am -- I hate to give more work but on the other hand, if

there are issues that were raised in those and in the argument that you all

would each want to address, I mean, I think it's fair to give you an

opportunity to do that mindful of the fact that we have to decide the case in a

couple of months.

MR. WILCOX: Well, we --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: But if you want to -- I mean, I

don't want to impose new work on anybody.

MR. WILCOX: Well, I would say Xcel very much wants

to give the Board some ideas on this. This is a big issue. I mean, the -- it

tends to send a stand-alone rate up in a hurry and we -- we would be more

than happy to do the little extra work.

I'm down to a couple of minutes, so let's just -- one thing

you've -- on the operating expenses and investment we talked about it a little

bit but I want to reinforce that predictability is the key. It's the key for all

parties in a litigation and there should be some, at this point in time,

predictability about what it costs to make a railroad out in the West. And so

I agree with you that that's what we should be searching for and that's -- we

sort of -- we hit that level, we thought in our evidence. I have a couple

thoughts on gaming but I'm -- or there's a question you asked in the -- in the

order of the 11th on methodologies but I'm about out of time.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: We'll give you two minutes to

give that quickly.

MR. WILCOX: Okay, why don't you go to those slides?

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Is that enough time?

MR. WILCOX: How much?

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Just a couple minutes.

MR. WILCOX: That's all, because, as I -- you know,

reading the -- well, again, your request for another methodology to replace

the percent reduction methodology came after this record was closed, so

that's an extremely complicated undertaking and we didn't do it in the last

four or five days, but we've thought about it and have some ideas. However,

the question as I see it is, do you correct abuses or the percent reduction

method individual abuses or adopt a completely new method because abuses

are possible?

And we think and we said this in our -- this is in the record,

that the Board has broad discretion if it finds a rate to be unreasonable to take

whatever action it wants to afford relief and promote proper pricing. So --

and we came to the side of the fact that the percent reduction methodology

can work, it has worked. So if you look at the ultimate goal of differential

pricing while protecting customers from monopoly pricing practices, then the

Board, we believe, can take action in individual cases and that can be a

deterrent for future cases because what we're talking about is if a railroad has

an existing pricing structure, and they send the rate way up here, above their

existing pricing structure, there's something going on and we believe the

Board can make that call as to whether that's permissible differential pricing

or whether something else is going on.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: How would our percent rate

reduction -- I mean, let's just say the railroad set a rate way up high.

MR. WILCOX: Right.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: How would that be reflected or

not reflected in our percent reduction method? How is it subject to -- is it

subject to manipulation by that or do you think or no?

MR. WILCOX: We think that the -- and we think that's

what BNSF did in this case. We think the railroad can set a rate, have an

idea of where it wants a rate to come out based on the guidelines and the

rules that would apply, and then set the rate way up high and to -- so no

matter what happens the rate would come down to a level that they're

comfortable with and that we had some discussion of that in one of the

Eastern cases.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: I mean, that's a supposition. Is

there any evidence that the railroad did that in this case? That was the

allegation in other cases as well.

MR. WILCOX: Well, that is the -- we believe there is

because going back to that first slide, you don't have to but going back to the

very first slide, it shows that the rate they put into place was over twice what

we think their pricing structure would be, you know, which is the average

rate for captive shippers. We think that the Board can look at the magnitude.

There's basically three criteria; a smoking gun, which I admit, we do not

have in this case, but a smoking gun where a memo or the kind of things you

wrestled with in one of the other cases; a rate that substantially exceeds their

pricing structure and you can -- and we think you can look at when the rate

was in place the miles per ton mile for captive shippers and there -- and we

think this is -- you can do this for coal only because their elasticities are

relatively the same.

And then we also think you can look and see what evidence

the railroad puts in. If they've put in operating expense and investment

expense and it's clearly inflated for the purpose of justifying the higher rate,

then that's another criteria. There may be others but we believe the Board

can make that call and once it does, you can apply the percent reduction

methodology and if -- kind of like a punitive damages type concept. I'm

sorry.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: No, it's interesting. That takes us

sort of full circle to the first question I asked, which is you know, you and the

railroad have both raised motives and how would we take that into account

and the answer originally was, well, you shouldn't in the SAC case, but I

guess in the end, the answer is you think we should.

MR. WILCOX: Well, the first answer was in terms of I

interpreted your question, what to do about revenue adequacy. I look --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Well, it was really this question

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which was, you know, you assert the railroad just raised prices high because

that's their policy and the railroad says, "Well, we're doing it because we're

revenue inadequate", and I say, how would we take those kinds of, you know,

non-SAC considerations into account. And then the answer is, I guess in the

end you're saying that we should take them into account. We should look

behind the parties and try to make adjustments to the case based on -- that's

what -- the railroad says that in their brief. I'm going to ask them about

that, too. But, you know, they openly say you should.

MR. WILCOX: Well, but they say you should take into

account changing -- you know, change the rules to allow them to make -- to,

you know, increase their revenues.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Exactly. They say because we're

revenue inadequate, so you should interpret SAC and --

MR. WILCOX: But we say --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: I don't want to put words in their

mouth. They're going to speak in a minute.

MR. WILCOX: But and then the answer to that was you

apply the rules in effect and that takes care of their revenue inadequacy for

this movement. We're talking I think about a different issue where they're --

they're not using that existing process. They're going outside kind of

abusing that existing process to try to game it, to try to get the right answers.

So I think there's some distinction and I think that the Board can make that

call in individual cases and I don't think you should lose sight of the

deterrence effect that, you know, you do that in a couple of individual cases

then the -- you know, the next carrier down the line is going to be less likely

to try that because, you know, you'll see rates coming in more along the

existing pricing structure and the percent reduction methodology will work

the way it's supposed to.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Okay, well, thank you. I'm sorry

to keep you over.

Mr. Weicher, I guess you're going to speak first.

MR. WEICHER: Yes, Chairman Nober, thank you. The

way we had divided our argument, if it's acceptable to the Board is I'm going

to speak for a few minutes on the motives issues and some of the commercial

issues. Mr. Sipe will address most of the more detailed cost issues. We

have very few Powerpoints. We'll keep that as limited as possible and there

are several representatives from our company here attending this argument.

This is an important case as all our cases are to the railroad.

If I may, departing from what I just said, the principal

areas I'm going to cover before it gets too far distant in the dialogue, I'd like

to make a brief comment on the RCAF-A/U issue in keeping with -- you

solicited comments. You made a couple of references to things off the

record. I don't want to go too far afield, but if I may, I'd like to make an

observation about that. From a railroad perspective, unit coal trains'

operations are about as efficient as you get in this business. We always want

to be more efficient but it's kind of hard to picture how you take -- at least

from a railroad perspective, an already under-staffed, under-asset based

super-lean SAC railroad that Xcel would propose and then expect to get

tremendous productivity increases over time. I think that's a stretch, but

they're entitled to their opinion. They're not even an old railroad that's --

we're always looking for new technology. But that just seems really way out

there.

In any event, if I may, what I want to address is the

commercial and pricing policy issues that are raised here throughout the

brief. And Mr. Wilcox' manner is very professional and very calm and

straightforward, but there are some pretty strident rhetoric in there, some

either false or nasty accusations or ad hominem arguments throughout the

brief and these slides. This is the political funny talk season and you know, I

suppose it's fair to call our opponent anything but we are accused of

everything from exorbitant pricing to gaming to punitive pricing to tying, to

having a monopolistic policy of price increases and I've probably skipped a

couple but it's that kind of stuff.

I assume it has two purposes, to sort of either inflame or

attempt to prejudice the tribunal that we should be somehow otherwise

treated than fairly under the standards or it links into -- I will be addressing in

some respects your first issue. I guess this whole gaming thing is sort of a

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basis to say, well, the Board should adopt a different methodology for the

revenue allocation, leaving aside that, of course, from our position there

aren't any revenues in excess of stand-alone costs, but that's the other bulk of

the phone book volumes you get. But if there were, then I guess they're

saying that we should somehow be punished or treated differently than the

basis that the Board has been following.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Well, I think that there's a

theoretical concern that has been raised in the last couple of cases and in this

one, that because of the way we apportion re -- let's just for the sake of

argument say we find that you know, the stand-alone railroad is getting

revenues or, you know, in excess of its costs and we need to reduce the rate,

that because of the way we apportion the revenues across all of the traffic on

it, that the actual Complainant gets less of the relief than, you know, at least

the Complainants feel they deserve. And so because of that, you know, the

railroad -- the end point is a function of the starting point and wherever the

tariff rate is set. That's, I think, the argument that's been raised but, you

know, what I've been struggling with and asked in the last case and this one

is, there's theoretical arguments and this is a very theoretical process and then

there's, you know, practical reality. In the contract negotiations was that a

consideration or not and you know, how do we -- it puts us in a very difficult

position, how do we take account of what's the theory versus, you know, the

reality of the case.

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MR. WEICHER: I think I understand the issue you're

raising and I see the conceptual conundrum or if one is looking for a totally --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: I'm not saying we believe that, but

that's the argument that's been raised.

MR. WEICHER: If that argument is pointing to there

should be a mechanistic way to find every element of what goes into this

massive SAC thing, that means that something does start with the price

initiated or proposed or established by the carrier, I guess two responses.

One, I'll address whether there's any reason to think there's something funny

here, this gaming thing, but as a more conceptual thing, this does start with

under the statute, the carrier's right to propose a rate. I mean, that -- and then

the burden of proof and I know you've said various things and the Board has

said things in its orders about where the burden really is and whether the

Board should help the Complainant's burden but fundamentally the statute

says the carrier establishes its rate, it's subject to challenge and then the

Complainant can make its case against it. So to the extent Congress says,

where does this thing start, I think it starts with the carrier's rate and I don't

think that's necessarily appropriate.

If I may, I think -- excuse me.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: That is what the statute says.

MR. WEICHER: If we look at where we are in this, and I

don't want to turn this into a tale of two plants, but I think we have to talk

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about where we came from on this to understand this -- the lack of basis for

this gaming allegation or how we got to how we are. This plant, as well as

another plant, the Comanche plant, were both covered by -- and I'm not going

to talk super details but it's all over the record, a united contract -- excuse me,

a consolidated contract for several years. And upon the -- one of the plants,

Pawnee and if I may take advantage of Complainant's map, if you don't mind

my referring to your map, is shown on the map at that Pawnee signal, you

know, clearly the way up. The other one is down near Pueblo, the so-called

Comanche plant. It's about 50 percent farther away.

The Comanche plant has been subject to a build-in threat

for many, many years. When the contract expired, Xcel asked for separate

bids to the two plants. There is some stuff in here about tying. I think it's

totally baseless. They -- BNSF complied. We never said we wouldn't quote

a rate to either or both plants together or separately. Obviously, like a

normal business, we'd like to get more business under contract for as long as

we can. That is a good thing for us. That's what we're trying to do.

What I think is important is when they came to us -- I'm not

quite ready for that slide yet because that might confuse this for a second.

When they came to us and asked for contract proposals, the record reflects

that the Pawnee rate we offered them was lower, it was lower, we didn't ask

for more, than the prior rate to Pawnee under the old contract and the Pawnee

and Comanche rates together under the contract proposals were lower than

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what they had been paying before. Obviously, we were trying to protect our

competitive risk position to the second plant and get more tonnage. And in

the final contract we agreed to for the Comanche plant, we kept that business

under contract for the time being and we provided trackage rights for future

competitive access to that plant in response to Xcel's request.

When the negotiations fell apart for Pawnee or were

unsuccessful --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: You can go ahead and finish.

MR. WEICHER: Thank you, and then --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: We'll give you a couple extra

minutes.

MR. WEICHER: Mr. Sipe might give me a couple, if I

need it and then you can --

MR. SIPE: If he asks me nicely, I will.

MR. WEICHER: We did establish a higher common

carrier rate than the contract proposals we had been making to Pawnee for the

Pawnee plant. We didn't refuse a quote to either one. We never declined a

quote to either one. I can't think of anything more common or rational in

business than to quote a lower rate for a contract with a term of commitment

or to quote a lower rate for more business to two plants than for individual

pieces of business.

And I think what's really key, and now you can put that

slide up, again, we're not putting numbers. There's a lot of confidential stuff

in the docket, you can pick apart all this, but these relationships are

important. The post-contract rates, when you put together what we are

proposing as the established rate for Pawnee or what's under litigation here

and what they're paying in Comanche on the right under contract, are lower

than the old contract rates. They're getting a good deal here. The

percentage increase in that Pawnee rate compared to the old contract, it is

higher but it's modest. It's -- I won't talk the numbers but it's less than was

talked about for those phasing things for one year a few years ago. I mean,

it's a little over single digits. It's not -- do we have a policy at BNSF to raise

rates where we can? Yes. Has our management said, "We are revenue

inadequate and wherever we can, we need to try to improve our revenue

posture". Yes, but --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Whoa, Mr. -- how would you

respond to the slide they put up at the beginning that showed that the -- I

understand what you're saying here that the combined rate is lower and you

know, I'll ask them to respond to that, but in the end, they put up a slide

earlier that said that -- you know, that showed how much higher the tariff rate

was than, you know, some other bench marks, and --

MR. WEICHER: Two things if I may. Their bench

marks, several of them were their own bench marks from their case. They're

entitled to show those, the Xcel case, the WCC stand-alone. TMPA is a

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much longer move, short haul moves -- and you asked for a response, I think

this is in these various dialogues, but I mean, a 12 to 1500 miles move is

going to look better on a mills per ton-mile, that's TMPA, than a short-haul

move. And I would also say that this slide is a much better depiction of the

commercial context of this move than either a regulated rate set by the Board

for a 14 or 1500 mile or other case, or a composite of stand-alone railroads.

It would not be unreasonable from our standpoint to have a presumption of

reasonableness that the past prior contractual context, I'm sure that we will be

accused that we were onerous 10, 15 years ago in the contract or something, I

don't know, but I mean, that was something that was out there for these

moves and this is the kind of relationship we have today to what's at issue

before this Board to what was moving this quote in the past.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Would your view be then that any

rate you charge for Pawnee up to the level of the combined rate was okay?

MR. WEICHER: At least that, if I understand your

question, yeah.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: You're saying that the yellow dots

go all the way up to the dotted line, essentially.

MR. WEICHER: Oh, certainly. I mean, I'm not saying it

couldn't go higher than that, depending upon -- I do not -- contrary to

counsel's assertion, we do respect SAC guidelines, there are maximum

reasonable standards. A lot of it has to do with the elasticities of demand.

Pawnee, if we look at the old contract relation, Comanche is farther in subject

to competitive alternatives. In the past more distant space, sort of the

old-fashioned rate kind of thing. In the more modern era Pawnee is more

inelastic. I think that's one thing we both -- both sides agree on and drive it

to different purposes. Comanche is less inelastic as shown by the built-in.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: I mean, I'll just say that, you

know, your initial premise was one that I would just come back to which is, I

understand what you're saying about, you know, we should take into account

the combined rate and that may go to motive but again, our job is to look at is

an individual rate reasonable. That's what the statute asks us to do, that's

what Congress asks us to do and you know, and in prior cases it's been

asserted that we shouldn't have a reasonableness standard. That, you know,

whatever the commercially justifiable rate is ought to be the rate and that's --

you know, for better or for worse, Congress has not said that. Our job is to

review each rate and see whether it's reasonable.

Now, I appreciate the context you're trying to put it in and

you know, I'm always unhappy when parties that ought to be working

together and settling these things are litigating before us, but that's the world

in which we live and that's why we're here and that's what we're here to

decide. And we do have to look at each rate on its own.

MR. WEICHER: I think -- I don't disagree with that and I

wouldn't purport to substitute any of our judgment for the general marketing

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sense of how much is too much. I mean, our marketing people are trying to

understand what will move coal, what will work with the plant. I think it is

interesting if you look at what is really going on here, how modest this is. Is

this a relatively high rate? In some context compared to longer haul rates

and things of that, yes. Is it unreasonable in no way in light of this

commercial context or in light of the Board's standards?

I don't think there's anything here in this case that

suggests a reason to change the revenue allocation method based on this kind

of allegation or this kind of -- whether that's the perfect method for all time, I

don't know. It's what the Board has used. If you were going to change that,

it would seem to me, maybe it's a thing for a rulemaking or maybe it's a thing

for a particular case if there's some really -- something going on. I'm not

sure what kind of smoking gun he's referring to but it's clearly nothing here

let alone of gaming.

This is commercial practice to try to move tonnage. I will

stop, excuse me, and defer to -- unless you have any other questions.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: No, I will -- I appreciate that,

thanks.

MR. WEICHER: Thank you, Mr. Sipe, for the time.

MR. SIPE: Good morning, Chairman Nober, Sam Sipe for

BNSF. I've got a little bit of a cold here so I apologize if I have to clear my

throat from time to time. I want to say two things preliminarily about being

here at the oral argument this morning. First of all, I wasn't sure for awhile I

was going to make it and if anybody doubts that in the real world there are

unplanned outages --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: You mean, like the Red Line

being out?

MR. SIPE: Like that, for example.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Being on Rock Creek Parkway for

an hour.

MR. SIPE: Even though it is a gold-plated, double-tracked

railroad.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: If it's any solace, if you weren't

here, I wouldn't be here either.

MR. SIPE: I was lucky to find a cab. On a serious note, I

think the oral arguments are a worthwhile endeavor and I think the reason

they're worthwhile is that it gives us a chance to talk to you about what's on

your mind and I have a few things that I want to say this morning but I'm not

going to let them get in the way of your questions. And I'm happy to spend

virtually all my time responding to your questions, and if there's something in

our case that we haven't made clear, an aspect of our position that you need to

understand better, I will give it my best shot.

I will also tell you right now that I am not a master of all

the minutiae in the record, but I believe I have a good handle on the

conceptual issues and most of the larger factual issues.

I want to make one more preliminary point that has to do

with the legal context. We've been talking about motives here and to some

extent we've been talking about how those motives relate to the legal context

as it has to do with BNSF's right to engage in differential pricing and as it has

to do with your obligation to protect captive shippers.

The statute and the case law including the guidelines, of

course, are very clear that those are competing responsibilities that the Board

has and what the statute and case law also make clear is that BNSF has the

right and I would say virtually the obligation to price differentially to captive

shippers. And we tried to establish a context in the record of this case to

explain to you that Xcel is a very highly demand inelastic shipper and they

didn't dispute it. So that's the fact that we're coming at this case from.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: And that's the point I was raising

earlier, which is, you know, I don't think the law or I agree that just because a

shipper is demand inelastic which is another way of saying captive and that

the railroad ought to be able to charge the commercially reasonable rate that

-- the commercially viable rate, that there's a rate reasonableness test and

that's our job to apply it.

MR. SIPE: I agree with you 100 percent. In some

perverse kind of way, I'm a beneficiary of the existence of the rate

reasonableness test. I'm here arguing the case. You know, the SAC

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constraint is a matter of law and we believe that there is an appropriate cap on

rates. I believe it not only as a matter of the statute but as a matter of sound

economics.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Well, let me ask you then,

because I -- in your brief, you say, "The SAC test is not a self-executing

formula, it's not like winding up a clock. The Board's statutory obligation to

take revenue adequacy into account means that the Board must assure itself

that the SAC analysis being implemented in particular cases consistent with

economic principles and policies that underlie SAC", and then you go on to

say, "When forced to resolve questions of methodology, it needs to consider

how its methodological decisions will advance the policies that led to the

SAC test", which as I understand it, is essentially saying, "If we're not

revenue adequate, give us the benefit of the doubt in applying the test". Is

that what you're saying?

MR. SIPE: I actually wrote that myself and I had hopes to

be saying something a little more nuanced.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: I skipped out some parts in the

middle. The nuance was there.

(Laughter)

MR. SIPE: But maybe Mr. LaRocca edited out the

nuances.

MR. SIPE: I'm just reading it word for word. It's right

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here.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: I recognize the language. I think the message I would like to leave the Board with, with that passage is if you decide in this case that a maximum reasonable rate is something that comes out let's say at the level of 195 or 200 percent of variable costs, then I think you need to look hard at your SAC decision and say this is concededly one of

the most demand inelastic shippers on the system.

If they're going to get differentially higher rates, this is one of the few guys you're going to get it from. They've got other plants where we're not going to get that. We're not going to get it at Pawnee. We're not going to get it at other plants in the Xcel system. This is one of the few and the statute says we should get it. And if you decide that we're only entitled -- I'll pick a number, to 200 percent of variable costs, then I don't think that's consistent with the statute. That was the flavor I was trying to convey.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Whatever, just --

MR. SIPE: I'm not saying there's no cap here. There could be a cap. I don't think we have priced up to that cap.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: I mean, I will say that I think there is a perception that sometimes what we do is pick a number and make the case fit the number, that you know, 220, 180, whatever, is what's reasonable and that's not really how it works. It's much more what you imply which is that we look at the evidence that comes in, you know. We

start with the physical plant, we start with the traffic group and look at what

the traffic group is and then decide what -- how much railroad do we need to

move it and then what kind of operational plan do we need to have to have it

and look at both the evidence and pick some and one and not the other, and

you know, try to piece it together and then from the ground up, see what that

shows. And if we were to apply the statement to that, you'd be saying, well,

you know, there's a dispute over whether or not we should allow cross-over

traffic. We're revenue inadequate so we shouldn't allow it. There's a

dispute between the operating plant. We're revenue inadequate so we

shouldn't allow it. So I guess I raise this on both sides because, you know,

on one hand the shippers allege, you know, I guess sticker shock if you will

at the rates that they were charged and say, well, it must be unreasonable, fix

it. And on the other hand, you say we're not revenue inadequate so when

these things come in, try to adjust the test to take into account that, and I don't

think we can do either one or if we did, I would -- you know, from what -- I

don't think we can do either one.

MR. SIPE: I don't want the Board to think that we're here

saying that you should cut us some slack because we're revenue inadequate.

The Board obviously has to take revenue inadequacy into account because

the statute says it has to. I think if you apply the SAC test properly in this

case, you're going to get to the right result and that would be my segue into

the evidence.

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CHAIRMAN NOBER: Okay.

MR. SIPE: On the cross-over traffic, we have taken the

position in this case that the Board really needs to think hard about whether

stand-alone models that rely on cross-over traffic to the overwhelming extent

that Xcel's do, really is consistent with the underlying economics of SAC.

Now, I don't know how much anybody up there wants to hear it and if you

tell me we don't want to hear it, I'll move on, but I will --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: What would you say is the

underlying economics of SAC? How would you characterize that?

MR. SIPE: The underlying economics of SAC is a full

comparison of revenues and costs.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: For that route, right, not for the

whole system.

MR. SIPE: For the traffic group, for the traffic group. It's

not for the route. If you go back and read the guidelines, there is not word

one about cross-over traffic in the guidelines. There are words about

grouping and there have been cases where traffic has been properly grouped

end to end to allow a full comparison of revenues and costs.

And what the testimony that we have submitted in this case

from Professor Ordover, who is a heavy duty serious economist, who was the

chief economist at the Antitrust Division in the early 1990's and who looked

hard at this and thought about it, is that when you use cross-over, you're not

doing the full comparison of revenues and costs. And let's take a look at

slide number 2 and this will illustrate vividly why that's the case.

The routes in yellow are the routes of all the movements

that Xcel selected for its stand-alone railroad. The route in red is the

stand-alone and what they've done is basically taken revenue from all that

traffic branching out all over the upper Midwest and south central United

States and they haven't explicitly accounted for any of the costs. That's what

cross-over does. And we've got a showing in our reply narrative, it's a stick

diagram that we've referred to in the brief and if you haven't read it, I hope

you will read it, that shows when you use cross-over you're at peril from

getting -- of getting the wrong result, of getting a different answer.

CHARIMAN NOBER: Now, in the last five or six, I mean, haven't we

pretty much accepted cross-over traffic in all of our cases?

MR. SIPE: Yes, yes, you have. And what I'm --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: And you think that's wrong.

MR. SIPE: What I'm -- I'm saying that conceptually it

hasn't been justified and that the likelihood of distortion increases as the

percentage of cross-over traffic increases. This railroad is overwhelmingly

cross-over traffic. If you exclude the Jeffrey movement which I will talk

about, and we believe strongly it should be excluded, 97.6 percent of the

traffic by volume in this group is cross-over. You don't know anything

about the costs incurred to handle those movements, of just taking some

allocation of revenues.

Now, obviously, you have accepted cross-over. If you're

going to accept cross-over here, the critical issue is to get the revenue

allocation correct.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: You proposed a different one.

MR. SIPE:

We have proposed a revenue allocation

approach that entails a density adjustment and what we tried to make clear to

the Board and I hope this came through, I don't know if it did in our filing in

February, is that the density adjustment only applies to a portion of the

revenue that gets allocated. In this case, 70 percent of the revenue that we

allocated was allocated on basically conceptually the same base that you do

under one of the mileage based approaches except that we used URCS rather

than a proxy for costs.

So we thought it was a little more specific and that's the

revenue we allocate to cover the attributable costs of the movement. There

is about 30 percent of revenue in this case left over and that's in the aggregate

but on individual movements, it's approximately that on most of them and

that we allocate in inverse proportion to density to cover costs that are by

definition unattributable. It's the existence of these unattributable costs that

the Board has said in its decisions gives rise to this phenomenon of

decreasing total average prices. So the average prices are lower on high

density segments and you'll notice here that the stand-alone railroad is for the

most part a high density segment but there's also a very high density segment

on BNSF from Northport over to Kansas City and we don't give BNSF any

more revenue on those segments.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Now, why do you think this is a

fairer approach than what the Board's accepted in 15 -- I mean, admittedly we

modified it some because the hundred mile block thing created some crazy

incentives.

MR. SIPE: Why don't you put up the next slide, the next

one after this. Next one after this. I think it is a -- you used the word fairer

and I think it is both superior from an economic point of view and for that

reason fairer if that's appropriate and these are the reasons why. First of all,

this approach distinguishes between attributable and unattributable costs and

you said in a footnote in the <u>TMPA</u> decision that at a minimum you need to

cover -- you need to cover attributable costs of both the off-line and on-line

segments and then you find some fair way to split --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Remember, my general policy is I

don't read the footnotes.

MR. SIPE: Well, you know, you mentioned that and I've

tried to be careful in our footnotes.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: You have been good, there were

none in the brief, I appreciate that.

MR. SIPE: I still read yours very carefully because --

(Laughter)

MR. SIPE: -- sometimes that where you find some of the

gems.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Yeah, you won't find too many

more footnotes in our decisions either.

MR. SIPE: But we think it's more precise to make this

distinction between attributable and unattributable costs which is a

characteristic of the railroad cost structure and we do that.

Second, the --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: The thing about the -- I mean, do

you think that there's a correlation between how we attribute costs for traffic,

the cross-over traffic and then how we attribute any revenue reduction once

we -- if, you know, for the sake of argument we find that the SARR's

revenues exceed its costs. I mean, do you see that there's -- that they are

kind of a matched set if you will?

MR. SIPE: If I understand the question correctly, I think

there is a correlation but not one that is sort of a strictly rigorous

mathematical correlation. I think that using an arbitrary revenue allocation

gives the shipper an opportunity to game the revenue side of the SAC

analysis as the Board recognized in the CP&NL case that the shipper could --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: You guys objected to the use of

gaming when it came to you and you know, now your going to let -- the

shippers themselves can game the SAC analysis which is the same thing you

objected to.

MR. SIPE: Absolutely. The Board recognized the

possibility ran both ways. I'm not saying in this case at the end of the day

there will be any basis for acting on gaming precisely because I think if you

do what we think you should do to the traffic group, that gaming will have

been eliminated but the possibility is there. The possibility is there in taking

a revenue allocation that accords disproportionately high revenue to the

stand-alone railroad.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Let me just, the revenue reduction

method, assuming that we have one, accords disproportionate relief to the

cross-over traffic as well. Even assuming -- you know, not that we ever

make errors, but even assuming if there's a bias one way or another, aren't the

biases consistent?

MR. SIPE: Why is it disproportionate? Everybody gets

the same rate reduction across the board.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: But if 97 or 98 percent of the

traffic is cross-over traffic, then 98 percent of the rate reduction goes to the

cross-over traffic, right?

MR. SIPE: Well, sure, but I don't see why that's

disproportionate. Are you saying that somehow cross-over traffic gets less

of a break in the rate reduction than the --

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CHAIRMAN NOBER: No, but your initial premise was

that cross-over traffic is wrong because it creates artificial densities, if you

will, on the stand-alone railroad. But that sort of -- I guess you could argue

the corollary of that is that whatever sort of hypothetical relief we give them,

most of it goes to the cross-over traffic as well so what you get on one end,

you kind of lose on the other; is that -- at least that's at least one way of

looking at it.

MR. SIPE: I understood from the CP&NL case and from

the discussion here this morning, that the potential problem with the

percentage rate reduction approach is where either the railroad or the shipper

quote "gamed the process going in", in the railroad's case by setting a rate

that was not really a commercially realistic rate, but a rate that was only

established at a high level in anticipation of litigation.

I think if the rate is what I will call a real rate, as this rate

clearly is, it's only modestly higher than an expired contract rate, well within

the range of what's observed all the time in the rail industry when you move

from contract to common carrier service. If the rate's at a real commercial

level then there's no possibility of gaming and if there's something else going

on that I'm not understanding then, I guess, I'm just not understanding.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: It's probably not explained in my

-- anyway, go ahead.

MR. SIPE: Okay, I had one more point about -- two more

actually about our revenue allocation and then I'll move on. We do take --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Go ahead.

MR. SIPE: That's okay. We do take account more

precisely of the cost of originating and terminating traffic under our method

and even with MSP you've still got this hundred mile block of credit which

overstates the costs of originating efficient unit coal train traffic. There is, as

we showed in the <u>TMPA</u> case, there's an Ex Parte 270 adjustment that's made

for unit coal trains that results in about a 25-mile block of credit for

originating that traffic and the reason that works to Xcel's advantage and our

disadvantage here is most of their movements are relatively short haul, so you

give them a hundred miles worth of credit for originating the traffic and

you're going to overstate the revenue. Since we cost it out, we don't have

that problem.

And finally, we do take account of the economies of

density, which, I think, you have to do if you're going to try to be fair about

allocating revenue because they exist in the industry. Let me just show you

a slide that reflects the effects of using our DARA approach. And Mr.

Wilcox had some allegations in his paper that he filed last week about how

we get a windfall out of this. That's just not the case. We have here their

MMP methodology and I realized he said that they would probably be able to

live with MSP but I wouldn't think he has much of a choice in light of your

recent decisions.

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Under what they've proposed, they get a division that's 38

percent higher than the stand-alone residual incumbent and it's driven by the

way the mileage blocks worked there. Under our DARA, it's not as if we

made a big revenue grab and left them destitute. They still get overall

proportionately higher revenue per ton mile on the stand-alone railroad than

the residual BNSF does.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Now we rejected the very same

proposal or very similar proposal in several eastern cases. Why should we

disregard that and adopt it here?

MR. SIPE: Because it's the best evidence of record here.

It's frankly conceptually just a couple of steps beyond the MSP approach. I

think to use a phrase we've all heard from time to time, you know, the perfect

should not be the enemy of the good. I don't think the burden is on the

railroads to go out and decide -- design a mileage pro rate methodology that

is -- satisfies every possible question anybody might have. It's better than

MSP or MMP.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Even though we evaluated it in

the last case and --

MR. SIPE: You didn't evaluate it on a -- you did not

evaluate it on a competitive basis in the sense of comparing it to the other

standard and sort of unpacking what do we do under MSP versus what do we

do under the density approach. You said there was this conceptual flaw and

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we tried to explain why -- what the Board saw as a conceptual flaw isn't there

and it's not there.

Let me move onto the Jeffrey traffic. It's a big issue in this

case. We think the Jeffrey traffic should be excluded and there are basically

two reasons. The Board in TMPA had a two-part test for excluding rerouted

traffic. One had to do with inferior service. The other had to do with

principles, underlying principles of stand-alone costs and we think the Jeffrey

traffic should be excluded under both prongs of that TMPA test. Do you

want to put up the next one?

The Jeffrey route of movement in the real world is over

Edgemont and Alliance to Northport.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Is this movement exactly the same

as what we disallowed in TMPA?

MR. SIPE: As what you disallowed?

CHAIRMAN NOBER:

Yeah, the standard we set in

TMPA, was that applied to the same kind of movement, one that originated

and terminated on the --

MR. SIPE: No.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: So what was --

MR. SIPE: No, you were talking about a different kind of

reroute in TMPA. What we're saying is two things though. First of all, the

underlying SAC theory is a complaining shipper should not rely on traffic

that doesn't use facilities to share the cost of those facilities. And the Jeffrey

traffic in the real world, does not use any of the facilities from Donkey Creek

down to Northport, does not.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: But haven't we allowed in prior

cases that kind of movement, putting aside whether or not we should?

MR. SIPE: You allowed it in the TMPA case and --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: So why should we differ from that

here if we allowed that?

MR. SIPE: Because we've shown a bright spotlight on it

and we didn't even shine a flashlight on it in TMPA. We've focused on it in

light of your recent precedent and it's a big issue in this case. It's a big

driver. Basically, what they've done is they've grabbed about 50 million in

revenue per year to contribute to the costs of a route that it doesn't use. And

our evidence also shows that it wouldn't use it in the stand-alone railroad

because they don't provide service to the shipper that's comparable to what

the shipper gets on the real world BNSF.

We had detailed evidence in our reply evidence about the

cycle times on the Jeffrey movement. The cycle times are substantially

shorter on the real world BNSF --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Can I ask a question? If you

object to cross-over traffic as a general theory which you do, there's lots of

cross-over traffic in this case. The only cross-over traffic you didn't show in

your model was this one. Why didn't you not show everything. If your

theory is, as you say it is, you shouldn't have cross-over traffic. You

shouldn't have included anything.

MR.SIPE: Because we wanted to present the Board with a

record that the Board could work with. If the Board was willing to --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: That's not what I asked. I asked

if your theory is, don't allow Jeffrey because reroutes are wrong and

cross-over traffic is wrong by SAC theory, then your operating plan shouldn't

have shown any of them, but it showed every one of them but this one.

Why?

MR. SIPE: Well, I was trying to answer it in a nuanced

way, but it -- frankly, it's a matter of how the litigation unfolds. You need a

record on which you can decide the case. You said to me a few moments

ago, we've accepted cross-over traffic in all our recent cases. Did we judge

that there was a realistic possibility that the Board was going to say, "You

know, BNSF is right, let's throw out the complaint because of cross-over

traffic". No. I mean, we're in a different kind of real world here.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: The reality of a SAC case, I

understand, such as it is.

MR. SIPE: It's the real unreality of a SAC case. The

evidence on cycle times is probative under one of the two prongs of your

TMPA test and I would point out that their attempt to fix the cycle times on

their rebuttal simply doesn't carry any water because the rebuttal string

diagram has the same defects and new defects. Each time they file the string

diagram, we identify different defects. They say, "Well, we can fix it". The

fact is that the cycle times constructed via the string program are unreliable.

Why don't you go to the next slide, please?

The Jeffrey traffic doesn't use the SARR route. The

SARR route is less efficient. It's shorter. There is congestion with the

empties fighting their way up the stand-alone railroad from the south. Mr.

Wilcox claims our argument on that should be stricken from the record, but

it's just argument based on the facts that we had in our reply evidence. The

transit times are longer as I've mentioned and there's also a contract issue that

bears on this. I won't get into it further here because the contract is

confidential.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Well, let me ask, if for the sake of

argument -- I'm not saying that we would find this, but if we somehow

decided we would follow precedent on this one, aren't we still left with the

problem that you're -- we followed precedent, we allowed this. We would

accept the railroad's operating plan but we're still left with an operating plan

that doesn't include these movements. How would we then -- this is the very

issue where the traffic group doesn't meet the operating plan that we've had in

four straight cases where we've had to go back for more evidence or I guess

extrapolate. What would you have us -- if hypothetically that were the

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situation here, what would you have us do?

MR. SIPE: Well, there is a possibility in this case that's

different and I don't think anybody has looked into the full legal ramifications

of this, but the Board has the model we used to develop our capacity and to

develop our operating statistics, that's true. The RTC model, it's transparent

in the sense that you can see the -- you can understand the output, you can see

the results of the analysis and I think the Board staff is probably capable of

using the model. Whether as a legal matter, the Board could in effect

generate evidence of record by running the model itself with a different

traffic group, that's not something we've looked at but it's something we

might all think about and if you're going to ask for further briefing, that's

something we might address.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Well, that's a chronic problem we

have in every SAC case now, which is as I mentioned in the beginning, a

traffic group that doesn't -- you know, you decide the traffic group toward --

you know, later in the case and it doesn't match either the physical plant of

the SARR or the operating plant and that's -- you've seen us struggle with that

and go out for more evidence in cases and that's sort of a fundamental issue

of these cases that we're struggling with. However we decide on Jeffrey,

that's an issue that will be in this case as it's been in every other -- as we've

had in recent cases.

MR. SIPE: I understand and there are lots of tough issues

in these cases.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: And that's been a struggle for, you

know, the royal us here which is what to do about that.

MR. SIPE: I think this model may be a way out. You

know, Mr. Wilcox referred to noticing something in the evidence in the AEP

Texas case. I noticed that the Complainant in that case has used the same

model that we advocate in this case and is going to make it available to the

Board and if that becomes that way these cases are litigated in the future,

there may be a way of addressing this problem.

Let me just -- you probably don't want to hear anything

more about the string program, do you, but I want to put up my -- I want to

put up my slide because --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: You don't have to spend a lot of

time on it.

MR. SIPE: I won't. I'll be really quick. Do you want to

put up the next one? I just want you to read the caption. There are

standards of admissibility of expert testimony that apply in agency

proceedings under the APA just as they do in Federal court and I think the

evidence is overwhelming clear that the string program would not be

admitted into evidence as expert testimony in a Federal court proceeding.

Let me -- I've totally lost track of how much time I have.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Eight minutes.

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MR. SIPE: Oh, I have eight minutes.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Well, like with Mr. Wilcox, we'll

let you finish your presentation within reason.

MR. SIPE: Okay. Well, I want to address your two

questions now. And we've already talked a little bit about the first one

which is the rate reduction method. And I'm not sure I understand -- based

on our earlier colloquy, Chairman Nober, I'm not sure I understand all the

Board's thinking underlying the CP&NL decision but I think I understand

what I read there and what I read there was that the Board said that there's a

threshold question whether there has been a showing of manipulation.

And I think if you've got a case where there hasn't been a

showing of manipulation then you don't need to reach the issue of whether

the percentage rate reduction methodology is wrong, but that may be

something I misunderstand. The point I wanted to make is there has not

been a threshold showing here. There's been a naked allegation on their part

but where we establish a rate that is only modestly higher and you know how

much higher it was than the expiring contract rate and is more or less in the

zone of what common carrier rates -- the relationship they bear to contract

rates. I don't think anybody can infer any manipulation. Whether there's

been manipulation on their part in the construction of the traffic group --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Can we just have people shut off

their cell phones until we're done? Is that all right? Thanks. My old

bosses used to have that as a general rule.

MR. SIPE: It's a good rule. Whether what they have

done in selecting their revenues could be construed as manipulation, I don't

think you necessarily need to get there because I think if you do the right

thing in terms of the stand-alone traffic revenues, you're not going to have

that manipulation and if you exclude the Jeffrey traffic, if you do the right

thing with the revenues here, I think it's highly unlikely that you would end

up with a finding that revenues exceed stand-alone costs, but if that were to

be the case, I do have one concrete suggestion. If the Board were to find

revenues that exceed SAC, it would be appropriate at that point for the Board

to ask whether any PPL-type cross-subsidy among different segments of the

stand-alone railroad is shown to exist as a consequence of its application of

the percentage reduction method.

If the rates prescribed for traffic on the relatively low

density Northport to Pawnee segment do not, after the rate prescription,

generate sufficient revenue to cover the costs of constructing that segment,

then the prescribed rates on traffic that uses that segment would have to be

adjusted upward to allow for coverage of costs and to avoid a cross-subsidy.

I don't know if you want to talk about that, but we'd be prepared to elaborate

on it at some point.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Please do. I mean, do you think

that's -- the evidence shows that here?

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MR. SIPE: In the current state of the record, the evidence

doesn't because in order for a PPL-type cross-subsidy analysis to be done, as

I understand it, the Board has to make some determination as to at least the

cost of constructing the railroad and you'll recall that's what happened. The

Board said, "We found that the costs on the western lobe of the PPL

stand-alone are such and such", and once we know that, then we can look at

whether the revenues are sufficient to cover those costs.

What we're saying is that in this case, given the way they've

constructed their stand-alone railroad, at the end of the day if you applied the

percentage rate reduction approach, it's very possible that you might end up

with insufficient revenue to cover the segment of the railroad from Northport

to Pawnee. And if that were the case, some adjustment would have to be

made.

Now, if the Board wants to think about alternatives to the

percentage reduction approach, i.e. doing away with it, one possibility if the

Board found that the challenged rates violated the SAC test, would be to go

outside the SAC construct and impose a rate such as the RSAM rate, for the

carrier in question. Because the RSAM is developed with reference to the

carrier's revenue adequacy short-fall, this approach would have the virtue of

addressing the statutory requirement that the Board take revenue adequacy

into account in determining the reasonableness of rates, justify it.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: We appreciate that. We'll look at

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it. Now, the second -- I just want to make sure before you wrap up you

address the second part which is, you know, looking at the -- we've asked

about the cost of this case for road property investment and operating as

compared to other ones, and I think yours show to be quite a bit higher.

MR. SIPE: Yeah.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: How would you address that?

MR. SIPE: That's where I am.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Okay, go ahead.

MR. SIPE: And what I was planning to do was answer the

question that you posed in your decision and I'll answer any further follow-up

questions you have. The question is whether operating and road property

investment costs differ significantly from the evidence accepted in recent

stand-alone cost cases in the west can be justified, not -- you know, maybe

you also want to know have they been justified here. Fair enough, but at

least conceptually, I'll tell you why they can be justified and then I'll talk a

little bit about why I think they have been.

Clearly, they can be justified because the Board and its

predecessor have made clear from the get-go that SAC is not a formula.

SAC is a result of decisions on numerous issues in individual cases and when

you issued or set forth your evidentiary standards in the recent CSX/Duke

case. I think you made it clear to the litigants at least I thought I understood

that the Board was saying, "We are going to continue to decide cases based

on the best evidence of record and here are the considerations that affect the

quality of evidence, and we think the quality of evidence on particular issues

varies from case to case.

I will tell you that we are always trying to get better.

We've done a bunch of these things and I think we do get better. Sometimes

we think we have the right answer and the Board doesn't seem to like our

evidence even though we've given it our best shot. In that case, we're going

to change our evidence and try to prove to you that something like in this

case crew wages ought to be substantially higher. In a prior case, we said it's

ridiculous to assume that everybody on this stand-alone railroad is going to

get up 270 days a year and go to work. "We won't accept your crew starts.

The Board didn't like our evidence on that. In this case

we've said, "Fair enough. You've got a bunch of people out there willing to

get up and go to work 270 days a year. Let's pay them what the market will

pay them if they go to work 270 days a year. We're putting in evidence

that's fully justified about what you would have to pay in crew wages to run

this hypothetical efficient stand-alone railroad. There are a host of issues

like that. There are issues on the construction side which vary from case to

case due to the different configuration of the stand-alone railroad. Now you

have said, you know, these involve Powder River Basin and they are similar

to some extent but the reality is that each stand-alone railroad we've seen has

substantially different features that may have yards in different locations. In

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this case, a huge driver of construction costs is earthwork in the yards and

what we've showed is that if you build the yards where you have to build

them, you're not going to be able to rely on the engineering reports that Xcel

relied on. You're going to have to build these yards with enough dirt fill to

actually make them feasible.

And I would like to say something, Chairman Nober, about

the issue of least cost hypothetical stand-alone railroads versus feasible lease

cost stand-alone railroads. I think in these cases it's really easy for the

Complainant at the end of the day to say, "Well, our evidence is the better

evidence because the costs are lower and everybody said we're supposed to

be the least cost stand-alone railroad. How can you argue with that"? The

answer is, they have at least the minimal burden of showing feasibility and

you have to show feasibility with reference to the real world because there's

no other standard that you can apply to show feasibility. Just as it's wrong

for the Defendant to posit a gold-plated stand-alone railroad, it's wrong for

the Complainant to posit an unrealistic efficient stand-alone railroad that is

not feasible and I've got two slides I'd like to finish up with.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: We see that on -- I mean, I'm not

going to say in this case, but we see that on both sides in every case, you

know, that's just a fact of litigation. I think we try to, at least in the cases,

evaluate the best evidence of record.

MR. SIPE: Well, I'd like to --

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CHAIRMAN NOBER: That's just a fact of the litigation.

MR. SIPE: I'd like to end by giving you a framework in

which to assess this issue of feasibility and the quality of evidence in cases.

And this is sort of -- this is a kind of big picture sort of thing akin to what Mr.

Wilcox has done. This is not in the record, just as the charts in his brief

were not in the record. We put this together for the hearing and we'll give

you a copy of it.

What you see here is expenses, operating expenses for

Class I railroads in mills per ton mile in the year 2001 and I think both Mr.

Weicher and I are proud to note that the lowest operating expenses on any

real world railroad are on BNSF, which that seems to suggest that maybe

we're the most efficient.

MR. WEICHER: And there's a lot of coal in there as you

know.

MR. SIPE: Look at what Xcel is on its hypothetical

stand-alone railroad. Operating expenses about a third of what BNSF, the

most efficient Class I, has been able to achieve. And look where we are,

vis-a-vis, Xcel. Sure, we're higher than they are, significantly higher but

look how much lower we are than real world operating expenses. I mean,

these guys are getting cut a great deal of slack when they come in and

hypothesize an efficient hypothetical stand-alone railroad.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Well, I appreciate this. Although

I guess if you put operating ratio up it would look a little bit different but --

MR. SIPE: Well, their operating ratio is like 30 percent.

I mean, Mr. Moreland would be chairman of the board if he could deliver

that.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: That having been said, I do think

that the parties, you know, have asked for, one of the things I get, and deserve

predictability from case to case and that's where, you know, I think as a

benchmark, we need to look at what we've done in prior cases and, you know,

be cognizant of that, and that's one of the starting points that I look at. It's

important to me that our cases be consistent, be not just internally consistent

but consistent across cases and now, whether or not that means that each of

our decisions is perfect, I don't know, and, you know, we'll try to --

obviously, the arguments you make are ones that we'll have to take into

account.

MR. SIPE: The final slide here pulls in both the revenue

side and the cost side, really because it's a measure of operating revenue per

employee. And what it sort of shows is what can you do with unfettered

imagination? Voila, you can hypothesize an efficient stand-alone railroad

that generates revenues of over a million dollars a year per employee.

Now, we said -- we said, "You know, you can be pretty

efficient", but compare what they have to what anybody has in the real world.

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CHAIRMAN NOBER: What -- I mean, you compared

them to Class I's and I guess that stand-alone railroad here would be a Class

I, but what would it look like compared to, you know, some of the larger

short lines or regional railroads?

MR. SIPE: I don't know that off the top of my head. I

wouldn't --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: That might not be -- you don't

have some of the agreement issues that --

MR. SIPE: I wouldn't think it would differ materially but

we can take a look at that. Anyway, I've taken a lot of time and I have tried

to respond to your questions.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: We appreciate that. Mr. Wilcox,

in response?

MR. WILCOX: Yeah, I have another 10 minutes. I have

a few points I want to hit in response to Mr. Weicher and Mr. Sipe. First,

Mr. Weicher said that -- and we're talking about the Comanche plant, that

there was a build-out threat at the Comanche plant for many years. It's

absolutely not true. BNSF -- it's in the record that BNSF fought that build-in

tooth and nail up until the year 2000, so to say that there was a threat for

many, many years and that's part of what we've countered their bundling

argument with in terms of the prior contract, that's -- the competition was not

there.

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The comparison of the rates, you know, tying in the

Comanche plant and the Pawnee plant, the gist of it seems to be that now that

Comanche seems to have -- now that Comanche has competition, they've --

you know, Xcel did what it needed to do to get competition at that plant.

Now that they have it, to the extent that they take advantage of that

competition, BNSF should be able to raise the rates at Pawnee as high as they

possibly can to offset any benefit to competition. That seemed to be what

Mr. Weicher was saying, that the Comanche bar, that graph went down, the

Pawnee graph could expand.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Yeah, he didn't tell an upper limit

on how high it could expand.

MR. WILCOX:

Exactly, so, I mean, that's -- and it

dovetails into what Mr. Sipe said, that what they're looking for is two sets of

rules or a range of rules, depending on the elasticity of the shipper. That if a

shipper like the Pawnee plant was really inelastic, then the rules should be

changed or skewed towards giving more revenues to the BNSF and we have

to keep going back to the guidelines. The guidelines are for the purpose of

giving some certainty to the parties. That's why they were passed or why

they were adopted. They're guidelines so that -- and there's -- the -- here's a

quote from the Guidelines.

"The negotiated contracts can often produce an agreement

which is more advantageous to both the railroad and to the shipper than the

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rate we would otherwise prescribe. Thus a benefit of these guidelines is to

enable both the shipper and the railroad to estimate the maximum rate we

would prescribe if the matter were brought to us for adjudication. We

believe that this will encourage contract solutions. So if you have -- they

have two sets of rules, there's -- where's the certainty that a shipper like

Pawnee -- or Xcel at the Pawnee plant could go to BNSF and say, "We've

done our analysis under these guidelines that have provided a reasonable

level of certainty. Let's negotiate a contract.

They would say, "Well, we're going to the Board because

we can -- we're going to get a different rate for you because you're more

inelastic.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: I mean, a lot of this is under seal,

so we can't get into it, but, you know, the evidence about the contract offers is

what it is.

MR. WILCOX: Well, and what that shows is that under

our analysis, the rate that was offered for Pawnee, our analysis said that that

exceeded a reasonable level that would have been prescribed by the Board

and the rate that was offered for Comanche was above a market rate that

would be gotten if we went out for an RFP. As the record also shows, at the

end of the day, the rate for Comanche went down substantially because of the

competition, because BNSF would not reflect the market rate, one bundled or

separated the plants, I don't like to use the word "bundling" because I don't

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think they were bundled, but we separated them out because Xcel wanted to

take advantage of the competition. As soon as that happened, the rate that

BNSF had offered went up substantially and it kept going up.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: I mean, unfortunately, what we

find -- what I find is that both in formal proceedings like this and in informal

ones, that the commercial relationship between shipper and carrier can be

complicated and unfortunately our statutory doctrines don't easily take into

account the subtleties and complexities of the total business relationship

between shippers and carriers and you know, I don't know how we do it.

That's a -- I mean, how would we?

MR. WILCOX: Well, the Board can establish guidelines

that are predictable so that the parties, when they're talking about their

commercial relationships can have an idea of what would happen if they don't

agree?

CHAIRMAN NOBER: I think that's fair and both the

railroad and you all and the shippers have asked us to do that and you know, I

think that that's a fair request.

MR. WILCOX: But if the landscape is changing or -- then

it's hard to get that certainty. So on cross-over revenues, the elimination of

cross-over, they're arguing policy for the most part. I mean, it's -- as you

point out, that's -- cross-over revenues have been in every case. In fact, in

the CP&L case the cross-over was about 90 percent, if I remember correctly.

And it's -- there's no reason to take cross-over traffic out of this case or any

other case. It's an integral part of the guidelines and don't lose sight of the

practical aspect of it.

If you had their way, every stand-alone case that came

before this Board would cover all those lines that you saw and one of the

practical benefits of cross-over traffic is to make these cases more

manageable. They're already huge enough. On the revenue allocation, on

this record, the modified mileage pro-rate by default is better because you've

already rejected DARA in three cases but we've said we could live with MSP

and so that should be what is applied in this case.

We -- as far as the technical arguments that Mr. Sipe raised

for why DARA, I think we've addressed those very thoroughly in our

response to their clarification. On the operating plan, as far as how the

Board could fashion a result, the distinction between our program and the

RTC program is that the Board has the program. It has all the algorithms, all

the logic. We each had our respective tutorials.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: And when you say you're all

doing that, that was a new innovation in this case, if you will, and I'll leave it

all to you all to decide if it was innovative or not, but it was a difference that

we did.

MR. WILCOX: Yeah, and we've had that and you can go

in and change the program. You can test the algorithms. The problem with

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the RTC is it violates the rules that you announced at TMPA, which is we've

got to have the program to be able to test the algorithms, have documentation

on the program but with the RTC, you just get the program. You can't go in

there and see what makes it work. And the AEP Texas Complainants have

used the model and I've seen that as well, but they recognized that it doesn't

do that. They basically -- they recognized that it does not meet the standards

of -- and they have arguments for why and we shouldn't overlook that but the

fact of the matter on this case, you have a program that you can use.

Finally, on the BNSF, the charts that Mr. Sipe put up, they

are not in evidence and the evidence supporting the charts are not in

evidence. And what is not on the charts is a comparison to stand-alone

operating expenses and our chart shows that BNSF operating expenses are

two times what the Board approved in -- what the Board found acceptable in

TMPA over -- well, they're over twice that of what the Board approved in

TMPA and they're almost twice what the Board approved in WPL, in terms

of operating expenses. So I think that's all I had on rebuttal.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Okay, well, go ahead.

MR. WEICHER: Chairman Nober --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Yes.

MR. WEICHER: And I certainly defer that Mr. Wilcox is

entitled to the last word, if I may make one comment because I think he

started -- misstated the record. May I make a brief comment to that, to

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which I would -- if I do, he's certainly entitled to have the last word.

I think he said that I made a misstatement or a false

statement about the threat of a build-in to Comanche. We acknowledge

there was no build-in and indeed in fighting off a build-in to the plant, we

were fighting off what we perceive to be a threat and that is clearly how that

plant is more competitive. I've struggled with that part of his brief because

I'm not sure what we're missing between ourselves on that but we believe

we're characterizing a threat of a build-in that's been there and that resulted in

access. But he's entitled to --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: To a certain extent motives really

aren't at issue. I mean, there was a -- you all agreed to trackage rights for

whatever reason, if it was a threat of a build-in or out of the goodness of your

hearts or for whatever reason and that's -- that is what it is.

MR. WEICHER: I don't believe we're misstating the

record. Maybe we don't understand it the same way. Excuse me.

MR. WILCOX: Since I do get the last word, I --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Yes, sir. Actually, I get the last

word.

(Laughter)

MR. WILCOX: I get the last word on this side of the

bench. The response to that is, that there's absolutely no evidence in the

record that BNSF considered that UP was a competitive threat to the

Comanche plant prior to 2000. They made the argument that it was -- you

know, they tried to fashion this bundling argument to justify what they did

and we came back and showed that there's not a shred of documentation or

evidence that BNSF thought there was a threat from UP when it was

contracting the last time around, and acted on it. So that's -- I mean, I just

want to be clear, that's what the record says.

Mr. Weicher may think otherwise but the record says what

it says.

MR. SIPE: Chairman Nober, I don't want to address this

issue, but I want to complete a response to a question you asked me, if I may,

that I don't think I gave a complete response to and maybe I did --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Mr. Wilcox, you object.

MR. WILCOX: I guess we could just go on all day --

MR. SIPE: Well, this is in the spirit --

MR. WILCOX: -- since there are two of them and one of

me.

MR. SIPE: This is in the spirit of a dialogue and trying to

be responsive to the Chairman's questions. You asked me why -- about the

Jeffrey traffic, why we excluded Jeffrey and left all the other stand-alone

traffic in and I gave you an answer that was basically -- that basically was an

answer that was a litigation decision. But there's another dimension to that

which is much more kind of obvious and I may have overlooked it and that is

the Jeffrey traffic was the only traffic rerouted. Everything else goes over

the route that they put it on and what they did, in fact, they chose the denser

route. They rerouted their own issue traffic so as to get the benefit of those

densities. And what we're saying is, you can't bring the Jeffrey along too

because it doesn't share the facilities. So that's what I should have said

earlier.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Mr. Wilcox, this will be the last

word for all of you.

MR. WILCOX: Yes. I'm not quite sure it's accurate that

we rerouted the Pawnee traffic. That traffic sometimes goes over to the

Edgemont, goes over the Edgemont line, but most of the time comes down

through Northport and so I think just I will stop.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Okay, well, first I want to thank

everyone for their arguments and I know this took over two hours and that's a

testament to the fact that there are a lot of complicated issues and that you

know, these are valuable for both -- for the Board and for all of you.

I would like to say first of all, you know, ultimately, and I

think there was a lot of discussion today about the contract negotiations that

both sides engaged in and what both sides' motives were and I think that

there's a reason for that which is that this is ultimately a commercial

relationship between the two of you that's got to be ongoing. I mean, these

plants are served by the BN and you're going to keep generating electricity

out of them and you're going to keep needing to have coal hauled to them and

you know, BN is a railroad and their job is to -- you know, what they exist for

is to haul traffic.

And I'm always sorry to see what are commercial

relationships wind up here. I mean, I can -- I know from all of you and I've

met with you know, each of you privately, that no one -- there's no place that

folks would rather be left than in litigation before us. And I don't take it

personally. It's -- you know, I understand and you know, we've tried to

make it -- you know, tried to streamline the process but the fact is, it's not a

place where anyone wants to be.

Now, we have these oral arguments and it's the first time

we all have to engage sort of publicly and talk about -- talk things out and it

turns out that in my view a lot of frustration gets aired with the relationship as

well as presenting the cases. But we do this so that in the process,

essentially, the case is a sunk cost. I mean, you've all sunk all the money

you're going to spend in it and it's just a matter of getting a decision. But

that's a long way of saying I still wish rather than seeing a decision come out,

you all were able to work this out and negotiate a rate that everybody could

live with that wasn't the product of litigation or wasn't, you know, imposed

upon you or, you know, or permitted because of litigation however the

decision comes out and so I guess the first question is, you know, is that

possible here? Is it still possible for you to talk and work something out?

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If it's not, you know, we accept it. We're going to make a

decision either way but -- I mean, I know that folks in both the companies are

here beside counsel for a moment.

MR. WEICHER: I don't want to -- is it appropriate to

respond or --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: If you can speak for your railroad,

sure.

MR. WEICHER: I'm not sure the right commercial people

are here today for that substantive a negotiation. We're always prepared to

talk. I think this case predates your mediation proposal that we've been

involved with in another situation. I think that's always helpful and could

work. Certainly, we're prepared to have that dialogue. I don't know if --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: If you want a mediator we can

assign one, but is there the ability to work this out? I know there are folks

from Xcel here. Can I recognize them?

MR. WILCOX: Sure. I think that would be the better

way to go.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: We're always willing to

talk about it.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: I mean, if you all don't think you

can work it -- that's fine. I don't want to -- you know, but I wish that you

would at least try to talk and see if it's possible, because that's the better

solution here rather than have the Board decide it. And I'll tell you that the

way these rate cases go, once they're decided, for whatever reason in many of

the -- if you look at many of the prior cases, they don't just end, you know,

they keep coming back and people come back on reconsideration and then

they come back for adjustments to the rate and, you know they seem to be --

they seem to go on and on and on. So while maybe most of the litigation

costs are sunk, not all of them based on my experience here. We seem -- we

decide three cases and we get them back in various forms. So perhaps, that's

an incentive to try to work together, but you know, I would ask that you at

least try that.

MR. WEICHER: We'll be happy to make sure that we

have a follow-up shortly discussion or conference call or whatever is

appropriate to find out if there's anything to report back, yes or no, within a

matter of days or something. I mean, just --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: But on the chance that that does

not work, I would like to give -- ask both sides if they would like the

opportunity to submit briefs. Now, I'm very mindful of generating more

legal fees and more -- you know, but I think here there are two

circumstances. One is we've had an oral argument and a number of issues

have been raised and both sides have offered some, you know, new ideas on

things that were just briefly outlined here that I think the Board would benefit

from some more expanded view of. And secondly, we had three cases

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decided from when the evidence was put in and you know, I think everyone

deserves an opportunity to adjust their presentations or at least to let the

Board know what they -- you know, if those have changed things at all.

So I would propose, you know, time is short before the

statutory deadline, that we give each side two weeks to submit supplementary

briefs and then one week each to reply to the others. Is that -- that's going to

have to be sufficient in this case.

MR. SIPE: I have a question. That is, do you think it's

possible the Board could identify the areas on which it would like to hear

further briefing, because there's such a vast canvas here and we've, you know,

written the 40-page briefs where we necessarily have to go lightly over some

issues. I think it would help us a lot if we were able to focus in on the issues

where the Board thinks it needs further help.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: I mean, clearly the two issues that

were raised today, Mr. Sipe, yours on a new method for revenue allocation

you know, for any rate reduction allocation and Xcel's on how we would --

on a new proposed method for the rail cost adjustment factor are two of the

things that we would obviously want to hear about. Let me -- perhaps we

could put out something a little later today that would, you know, let us be

more specific like we do before the oral arguments, just to give you some

areas to look at.

MR. WILCOX: Yeah, I would confer with --

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CHAIRMAN NOBER: Yeah, we'll try to give you some

guidance on that.

MR. SIPE: And I know time is short, Chairman Nober,

but I also know we have a major filing next Monday in another rate case and

wouldn't even be able to start thinking about this until next Tuesday at the

earliest. So if you could maybe make it three weeks rather than two, I would

appreciate that.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Let's see, that would be about a

month before the case has to be decided.

MR. SIPE: Or just another three days, so you know, we'd

have another couple of weeks to actually do it.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: How about two weeks from

Monday?

MR. SIPE: Okay.

MR. WILCOX: For the record, I mean, two weeks is fine

with us.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Okay, we'll give you the weekend.

Is that acceptable to you?

MR. WILCOX: We'll give Mr. Sipe the weekend.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: And we'll try to put something out

later today to let everyone get started on that, just to go through -- I would

say that, you know, some of the -- there were some new issues that we

addressed in the Eastern cases dealing with, you know, off-SARR traffic and

some evolutions of our standard which were addressed today. You know,

for example --

MR. WILCOX: Well, here we have no off-SARR

reroutes here so --

CHAIRMAN NOBER: No, true, but you were addressing

the standard we used for the off-SARR reroutes about, you know, the length

and the presumption and --

MR. WILCOX: Right.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: So those were some of the

concepts we have in those cases have been at issue today and you know, in

fairness to all of you, the three cases is usually a several year diet of rate

cases, so you know, there were some different things that came up there.

MR. WILCOX: Is the -- are you going to impose a page

limit on those briefs, which is fine with me. I'm sure it's fine with my client.

Well, let me see what the issues are first.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Well, a 40-page limit are a typical

page limit for these and I will say that I've now read briefs in many cases and

I don't think -- I think 40 pages is more than sufficient to say what needs to

be said.

MR. WILCOX: So do I.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: If folks would rather it be 25,

that's fine, too.

MR. WILCOX: Right, 25 or 30, depending on the issues

but I think -- I thought the 40 pages last time around was -- I didn't think we

needed that many.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Okay, 25.

MR. SIPE: We're comfortable with whatever the Board

wants.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: All right, we'll pick a number and

put it out but --

MR. WEICHER: The longer your list, perhaps you'll add

a couple of pages. The shorter your list, great.

MR. WILCOX: Right.

CHAIRMAN NOBER: Okay. And again, I want to

thank everyone for their presentations. Every time we have one of these, I

never ceased to be impressed by, you know, the quality of the presentations

that the folks make and how helpful they are to us. Now, I will tell you that

this is hopefully the last one of these that I do alone and that's, I guess the

good news and the bad news. The bad news is that we took two hours and

15 minutes with just me here, and so if you had, you know, two other Board

members, you know, I would settle in for a longer day. But on the other

hand, I do think that it's very important for us to be able to have -- for us at

the Board generally, to be able to have an opportunity to have a dialogue

about these cases. You know, these records were put back in, in September.

You know, sometimes things said on paper aren't always able -- you know,

we have questions about and you see in the dialogue that I think it's very

helpful.

So I appreciate your coming in and I know that it was a lot

of work to get prepared for these. These records are very, very long and you

know, I can ask you about anything and you have to be prepared to answer

about anything and -- but I do think that they are very valuable and you

know, I'm very mindful of not just having these for the sake of having them,

but having them because they help the Board make better decisions.

So with that, unless there's anything further from either of

you, we'll stand adjourned.

MR. SIPE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. WEICHER: Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m. the above entitled matter

concluded.)